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A.W.Phillips estimated his famous relationship between unemployment and wage 
inflation entirely from pre-1913 British data about which he said little.  His wage series 
was in fact partly interpolated and the remainder were ‘Standard Rates’, set unilaterally 
by trade unions:  members offered work at sub-‘Standard’ wages could claim 
unemployment benefit. Phillips’ unemployment data came from the same unions, and the 
statistical relationship is unsurprising.  The paper analyses the wage-setting process 
within the Amalgamated Engineers, the largest national union pre-1914.  The largest 
single determinant of wage reductions was local unemployment, but increases were 
determined more by the union’s finances and its success in recruitment. 
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Deconstructing the Phillips 
Curve for pre-1914 Britain 
A.W. Phillips’ 1958 study of the apparent trade-off between unemployment and wage 
inflation has been one of the most influential empirical studies in the history of 
economics.1 Given the innumerable studies which have since appeared, it may seem 
foolhardy to claim that anything new can be said about Philips’ work except from the 
most abstruse of econometric perspectives.  However, Phillips’ original paper differs 
from almost all the studies which followed in being concerned with really long-run 
historical patterns.  The impact of the paper resulted not from any compelling theoretical 
analysis but from the robustness of the empirical relationship demonstrated.  Phillips 
showed not merely that the same broad pattern held over a substantial period, but that a 
particular functional form and set of parameters gave a good fit to data for many separate 
periods within an overall run of 96 years;  although the years since he wrote have seen 
large departures from that relationship, it is unsurprising that at the time the existence of 
the relationship was almost unquestioned and debate concerned the reasons for it. 
What follows is an exercise in statistical archaeology.  In order to obtain such a long 
run of records for Britain, or anywhere else, Phillips had to go back to periods before 
modern labour statistics became available.  More than half of his entire run of data covers 
a sequence of seven trade cycles between 1861 and 1913, and this was over this period 
that he estimated the parameters of his model.  Before the First World War, the British 
government had only the most limited involvement in the labour market, there being no 
state unemployment insurance system before 1911 and no regular surveys of either 
unemployment or wages.  So who was compiling information on unemployment and 
wages in the 1860s, and what exactly was measured by the resulting data?  These are the 
questions this paper attempts to answer.  It explores the operation of skilled labour 
markets and reinterprets Philips’s own findings, but its relationship to the wider Phillips’ 
curve literature is for others to judge;  in particular, it questions whether the trade-off that 
Phillips identified for pre-1914 Britain should be seen as a macro-economic relationship 
at all. 
The paper is organised into three sections.  The first traces the data used in Phillips’ 
paper back through a number of stages to the original sources.  The second explores 
qualitatively the micro-economic relationship between wages and unemployment within 
specific local labour markets;  for example, skilled engineers in Sunderland.  The third 
section presents a simple statistical analysis of this relationship, using data drawn from 
largely unexplored primary sources to study the fine structure of British labour markets. 
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I 
Almost all research into pre-1914 British labour markets relies, knowingly or 
unknowingly, on the work of the Board of Trade Labour Department.  Until the late 
1880s, three arms of government gathered labour information:  the Home Office was 
interested in industrial matters only as a source of social unrest;  the Local Government 
Board tabulated numbers of paupers, but most were orphans, the aged and the infirm, 
outside the labour market;  and Royal Commissions and Select Committees conducted ad 
hoc surveys, generally with vague questions and miniscule response rates.2  Middle class 
concern with the ‘condition of England’ and the growing political importance of the 
labour movement led to the appointment in 1886 of a Labour Correspondent.  The details 
of this appointment reflected the location of existing expertise.  The first Correspondent 
was John Burnett, previously the General Secretary of the Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers (ASE).  He had first come to public attention as the leader of the Newcastle 
Nine Hours movement of 1871, further discussed below.  He was based within the Board 
of Trade, the department with greatest experience of gathering statistics because of its 
traditional concern with overseas trade;  conversely, Local Government Board statistics 
were notoriously unreliable.3 
Assisted only by a few clerks, Burnett produced a series of major reports:  on Trade 
Unions, on Strikes and Lock-Outs, on hours of work, on working class expenditure and so 
on.  In 1892 his office was expanded into the Labour Department of the Board of Trade, 
headed by a new official, the Commissioner for Labour.  The first Commissioner was 
Hubert Llewellyn Smith, an Oxford mathematician who had previously worked at 
Toynbee Hall in London’s East End and on William Booth’ survey London poverty.  The 
Labour Department began with six officials and about thirty clerks, expanding rapidly, 
plus a network of local correspondents around the country sending in reports.  In 1916 it 
became the main component of a separate Ministry of Labour.4 
However, until the creation of a network of labour exchanges in 1909 and the National 
Insurance system in 1911, the Labour Department lacked any mechanism for collecting 
statistics in the field.  Its role was largely to collate information recorded by others, and 
the network of local correspondents was a formalisation of this:  their task was to ‘report 
at once to the Central Office cases in their districts of strikes and lock-outs ..., changes of 
wages, hours or other conditions of hours in the chief trades, and other events likely to 
lead to disputes;  the opening and closing of large industrial works, and the formation and 
important proceedings of trade unions, trades councils, and co-operative societies.’  The 
twenty-six part-time correspondents could be expected to know of such events because 
they were all trade unionists, ten were General Secretaries or equivalent, and each 
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represented the key trade of their area. For example, the correspondent for Tyne and 
Wear was the ASE district organiser for the area;  for Oldham and Bolton, the General 
Secretary of the Operative Cotton Spinners;  for Liverpool, the District Secretary of the 
National Union of Dock Labourers.5 
This system of Whitehall officials and unionists in the field provided Phillips with his 
data, but this is not immediately apparent in his article.  Figure 1 presents essentially the 
time series of wage rate changes and unemployment underlying Philips’ analysis, as 
identified in the footnotes to the paper.6   Taking the rate of change of money wage rates 
first, he calculated this from the index of hourly wage rates constructed by Phelps Brown 
and Sheila Hopkins.7  This study in turn drew its wage rates for Britain primarily from a 
1909 paper by George Wood of the Labour Department, which combined hourly rates for 
workers in agriculture, building, printing, shipbuilding, engineering, coal, puddling, 
cotton, wool and worsted, gas, and furniture, using weights based on the relative numbers 
employed in 1850.8  Wood commented that: 
the inclusion of railway servants, domestic servants, the clothing trades, and one 
or two other large industries which we cannot, for want of material, trace in 
sufficient detail, would probably affect the final result;  but it is improbable that the 
effect would be very great, as the numbers already included are so large. (p.94) 
However, there is another problem in using Wood’s data for the study of the behaviour 
of aggregate wages over the trade cycle.  Some sectors were well-documented: ‘we have 
what may be regarded as final estimates of the course of average wage rates in building, 
engineering, shipbuilding, and printing (compositors)’ (p.91).  However, Wood’s concern 
was with long-run trends in overall working class living standards, and he therefore also 
used much more problematic data for other sectors.  He does not fully document all his 
sectoral series, but that for cotton is based on data for 1859-61, 1871, 1880-82, 1886, 
1891-3, and 1905-8: 
Intermediate years have been interpolated on the assumption that all increments 
due to increased speed of machinery, more machinery per operative, reduced 
proportions of children, &c., have been uniform and regular during these years. 
(p.92) 
Clearly, time series constructed by linear interpolation could not contain the large cyclical 
swings with which Phillips was concerned, hence volatility must come principally from 
the data for building, engineering, shipbuilding, and printing, the other series mainly 
damping down the aggregate swings.9 
Wood’s 1909 article gives few details of the series for individual sectors, but he and 
his collaborator Bowley were responsible for a series of nineteen articles in the Journal of 
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the Statistical Society between 1898 and 1910, totalling some 450 pages and covering 
agriculture, printing, building, engineering and shipbuilding, and cotton; and also for an 
unpublished Board of Trade report of some 350 pages.10  These listed wage rates for 
particular towns and occupations, and were the raw material for almost all subsequent 
research on wages in the period.  Although some information came from employers, the 
main sources of continuous series in the sectors Wood saw as unproblematic were trade 
union reports of ‘standard time rates’.  Elsewhere, Bowley commented ‘the history of 
wages must be sought to a great extent in the records of trade unions’;11  what precisely a 
trade union meant by a ‘standard rate’ is discussed in the next section. 
Turning to unemployment, Phillips drew his pre-1911 series principally from a 
government report of 1905,12 supplemented from a 1933 statistical abstract;13  these 
sources have of course been used by many writers and are easily available in the standard 
abstracts of historical statistics, but their origins in the work of the Labour Department 
have not been extensively explored.14  From its creation, the Department systematically 
abstracted information from the current  reports of trade unions, and from 1892 onwards 
its Labour Gazette included a national unemployment time series, based on twenty-three 
trade unions.  The 1905 report used by Phillips extended this series back to 1851 from 
earlier union reports. 
These data took two forms:  actual numbers of union members unemployed at the end 
of each month, and where this was not available an estimate based on a union’s annual 
expenditure on unemployment benefit.  Table 1 assembles membership information on 
the main unions contributing to the early series.  It includes all twelve unions providing 
unemployment counts in the 1905 report and adds all unions listed in an earlier report as 
providing a continuous unemployment series based on a monthly claimant count 
beginning in 1875 or before.15  Some of the unions providing expenditure data would 
seem to have paid benefits only to strikers, those affected by mining disasters, those 
travelling in search of work and so on;  this makes the rates for mining and textiles highly 
problematic, as most unions paying benefits specifically excluded ‘slackness of trade’.16  
The bottom row of the table gives the total membership of all unions contributing to the 
Board of Trade’s series, unfortunately only available from 1881 onwards.17 
Comparing the column totals with the final row, in 1880 those unions listed in table 1 
contributed most of the membership covered by the national series but the proportion 
subsequently declined.  In 1860 and 1870, the metal trades provide respectively almost 90 
per cent and 70 per cent of the total, and the overall series was inevitably dominated by 
the experience of this sector.  Most other unions included were in building, wood-
working and printing, all artisan sectors into which entry was controlled by 
apprenticeship and within which unemployment rather than short-time working was the 
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main response to recession, unlike textiles or mining.18  Overall, in 1880 66 per cent of 
those covered by the unemployment statistics were in just four trade unions, and 32 per 
cent were in the Amalgamated Engineers alone;  in the 1860s, the engineers were 
probably in a majority.  Wood’s comment that reliable wage data were largely limited to 
‘building, engineering, shipbuilding, and printing’ seems to apply also to the Labour 
Department’s unemployment data.19  This conclusion reflected the Labour Department’s 
reliance on the well-organised trade unions in these sectors for data, and it is to these 
unions that we now turn. 
II 
Having tracked Phillips’ unemployment and wage series down to their origins in the 
operations of artisan trade unions, what do they measure?  This requires an investigation 
of how unions operated and there were significant variations.  The analysis that follows 
concentrates on the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, the largest national union of the 
period, the model for most other artisan unions and the subject of the concluding 
statistical analysis. 
The most direct statement of any union’s procedures were its rulebooks, which 
generally described the operation of welfare benefits in great detail.  However, they were 
much less specific about industrial matters, and the interaction between benefits and 
bargaining.  What follows therefore draws on additional sources.  Firstly, the Executive 
Council minutes of the ASE are available from 1852 onwards but pose major problems of 
interpretation:  the Council met four times a week,20 and the minutes occupy several 
volumes for each year, but each minute records only the resolution adopted, not the 
background or discussion.21  Secondly, the ASE’s General Secretary, William Allan, was 
cross-questioned on the union’s industrial policy by the Royal Commission on Trade 
Unions of 1867-9.  These sources present only the perspectives of London-based 
officials, not those responsible for bargaining within local labour markets, but a third 
source covers these, in a later period:  in the early 1890s the Webbs interviewed with 
local union organisers from several unions around the country.22 
Turning first to unemployment statistics, the figure tabulated for each branch in the 
ASE’s monthly reports was the number of members signing each branch’s vacant book 
and in receipt of ‘donation’ benefit on the last working day of the previous month.23  The 
requirement that men regularly ‘signed-on’ was a test that they were genuinely seeking 
work, and remained a feature of British unemployment insurance until relatively recently;  
it also provided a straightforward means of counting the unemployed. The ASE’s rules 
further defined eligibility for ‘donation’ as follows: 
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Should any free member be thrown out of employment under circumstances 
satisfactory to the branch to which he belongs, and not [in arrears], or non-free 
member be withdrawn from his situation by a branch district committee, or 
Executive Council, and continue out for three consecutive days, he shall be entitled 
to the sum of ten shillings per week for fourteen weeks, seven shillings per week for 
thirty weeks, and a further sum of six shillings per week [indefinitely].24 
This benefit certainly covered men losing their jobs because their employer had no work 
for them, as often happened when orders for machinery dwindled at the onset of a 
recession.  However, the phrase ‘circumstances satisfactory to the branch’ also covered 
men offered work at an unsatisfactory rate of pay, while the rules make it clear that a man 
otherwise ineligible for donation could be granted it if ‘withdrawn from his situation’, i.e. 
called out on strike. 
Several features of the period need to be understood.  Firstly, employers’ attempts to 
impose wage reductions were common and the distinction between a strike, a lock-out 
and men simply becoming unemployed was often unclear.  Secondly, even in engineering 
there were numerous small employers, hence the union was seldom involved in collective 
bargaining in a modern sense;  it had rather to give its individual members clear 
guidelines as to how to respond to wage offers.  This last point was true both nationally, 
where the Executive Council set guidelines for the districts rather than bargaining with a 
national employers’ organisation, which only became effective in the late 1890s;25  and 
locally, where the district committees might bargain with major employers but could not 
deal with each individual employer of one or two maintenance men. 
Another crucial characteristic of the period was the strength of the trade cycle, 
ensuring that wages in engineering and similar sectors were in constant flux, and making 
unemployment insurance so attractive to those workers who could afford it.  This account 
emphasises the interaction between that insurance and industrial bargaining, but changes 
in numbers on ‘donation’ benefit were, unquestionably, primarily a function of the stage 
of the cycle, not the level of unrest.  For the ASE, direct evidence comes from the very 
different behaviour of numbers on ‘contingent’ benefit, reserved solely for disputes.  
However, recessions first manifested themselves in engineering through a drop in orders 
for new machinery, leading to employers attempting to cut wages so as to aggressively 
compete for the remaining orders.  In general, recessions meant a genuine reduction in 
employers’ ability to pay;  and their relatively limited fixed capital reduced incentives to 
maintain production for stock.  At the same time, unions were consciously involved in a 
long-term struggle to maintain wages during recessions and advance them in booms;  as 
William Allen told the 1867 Royal Commission, ‘we keep what we can get as a general 
rule’.26 
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So what guidance did unions give their members in dealing with wage offers from 
employers?  This was precisely the role of the ‘Standard Rate’ as tabulated in the union 
reports.  That rate was certainly not a measure of earnings, which were affected by 
elaborate systems of overtime pay, bonuses for working at a distance and so on;  in most 
districts these were fixed relative to basic rates through long-established practice.  Neither 
was the ‘Standard Rate’ an average over the experience of different workers within a 
locality;  crucially, it was laid down by the union, sometimes as a result of bargaining 
with employers but often unilaterally, not the result of a survey of workers.  The Webbs 
stated  that ‘the Standard Rate is a minimum, not a maximum’;27 this was much closer to 
the truth, but  it was in no way binding on non-unionists, and even union members might 
accept work at lower pay. 
The ‘Standard Rate’ provided union members with a benchmark, and it had a more 
specific function:  it defined the reservation wage level below which they were entitled to 
claim ‘donation’ benefit rather than accept offered employment.  Given that benefit rates, 
at an initial ten shillings per week, were far below Standard Rates even in the lowest paid 
localities, they might still choose to accept the work.  Under these circumstances the 
union might decide to require them to leave their jobs in the interest of maintaining 
overall wage levels;  should they refuse, the union had the sanction of expulsion, which 
meant loss of all accumulated benefit entitlements including pension rights.  However, it 
is unsurprising that the union offered the positive inducement of contingent benefit, paid 
to strikers as a supplement to donation benefit.28 
How were these mechanisms used in practice?  Firstly, although unions had no 
contractual obligation to pay benefits to their members at any particular rate, or indeed to 
pay any benefits at all, successful unions changed their rates very rarely:  the ASE 
maintained its 10s. per week top rate for donation benefit from 1851 to 1911, although 
after 1885 members of under ten years standing had benefit terminated after two years.  
They behaved as if they had a contractual obligation to their members, and the basic rules 
and scales of benefits were effectively fixed.  Secondly, as shown below, the standard rate 
was varied in response to economic conditions but in a highly constrained manner:  in 
much of the country it changed only once or twice in fifty years, and then only upwards, 
while in a few localities it varied more frequently and sometimes dropped sharply.  
Thirdly, the fact that in many centres the rate was never dropped, and the sustained high 
levels of benefit expenditure which the unions carried through recessions shows that 
while they were making some concessions to economic pressures they were still actively 
resisting them.  Here the engineers contrasted both with those sectors, notably mining, 
which operated a sliding scale tying wages to product prices,29 and with those unions, 
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notably in iron and steel, which refused to accept any pay reductions in recessions and 
then collapsed through catastrophic loss of membership.30 
Study of a specific period can provide a clearer understanding of the roles of different 
actors within the union.  The late 1860s and early 1870s featured a major recession with 
its trough in 1868-9, the suspension and re-introduction of Contingent benefit, and the 
‘Nine-Hours’ movement of 1871-2, which began as a dispute in the north-east of England 
over working hours but became a nation-wide campaign.  The actions of the ASE’s 
General Secretary and Executive Council can be documented in detail, but the latter 
consisted entirely of London members and consequently acted more as trustees to the 
union’s funds than as the active initiator of industrial strategy.  The union’s policy was set 
by a delegate meeting every two years and between such meetings the highest authority 
of the union was arguably the rulebook, not the Executive. 
In any given locality, the conduct of bargaining and disputes was the responsibility of 
the local branch or, in any town with multiple branches, the district committee.31  
Information about these committees is limited;  the original 1851 rules of the ASE state: 
They shall have power to place on the funds of the society any member who may 
be discharged for refusing, in accordance with their advice, to infringe any of the 
rules or recognised customs of the trade;  or who may be discharged for carrying 
into operation any measure for the benefit of the trade, which has been agreed to by 
the society, and authorised by the Executive Council, such as abolition of 
‘piecework’ [or] ‘systematic overtime ... No committee shall expend ... a greater 
amount weekly than is contributed by the members they represent ... , unless by 
consent of the Executive Council.32 
However, this rule was deleted after the union’s defeat in the 1852 lockout and although 
district committees re-appeared in the 1854 rules there was no reference to dispute pay 
and the committees’ job was stated simply as to ‘watch over the interests of the trade’.33 
The union pooled the income and expenditure of all branches at the end of each year 
by a process known as ‘equalisation’, and therefore funds spent on unemployment or 
contingent benefits were a cost to the whole union;  this seems to have been the principal 
justification for the extremely detailed financial reporting operated by the union.  It is 
clear from the EC minutes that the General Secretary carefully examined all branch 
returns, often wrote requesting clarification, and on occasion arranged for visitations by 
officials from other branches.  The minute books record a flow of instructions to 
branches, and the EC clearly sought to oversee the operations of District Committees but 
was not always successful.  Consider these minutes from 1866: 
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2nd Jan. That the Bradford D. Committee cannot be permitted to use the society’s 
funds [to pay] expenses connected with the short-time movement in that 
district. 
9th Feb. The Council considers that the members of the Jarrow branch did wrong in 
mixing up with the nine hours movement in that place without first consulting 
the Newcastle-on-Tyne district committee, such committee having been 
established for the express purpose of looking after the interest of the trades. 
9th Feb. That the Hull D. Committee be informed that in as much as the Committee 
issued a memorial to the employers of Hull without the sanction of the 
Council, the Council deemed it advisable not to give any definite instructions 
on the subject seeing the demand on the employers had already been made ... 
and that the attention of the committee be drawn to the fact that the 
proceedings of District Committees are subject to the approval of the 
Executive. 
7th Mar. That a conference of delegates be held in Liverpool as soon as possible for the 
purpose of considering the wage question &c., and that the delegates be 
appointed from the following places, namely — the Liverpool and Birkenhead 
branches, one each, two from the Liverpool D. Committee, one from Bolton 
D. Committee, one from the Oldham Local D. Committee, one from the Bury 
and one from the Blackburn D. Committees, one from Manchester Local D. 
Committee, also Mr. Austin, together with two from the Council.34 
District committees were clearly acting without the authority of the EC.  These 
examples come from a prosperous period when the union was seeking better wages and 
shorter hours.  By early 1867, the onset of recession meant wage reductions in many 
towns, and the EC then routinely authorised strike pay.35  By the spring of 1868, the 
recession had deepened and wage reductions were more widespread.  A deputation of east 
London members calling on the EC in January 1868 reported: 
Notice of the reduction had been given to George Clark and two or three others 
on Friday.  [The employer told Clark] there was to be a general reduction 
throughout the London factories [and] did all in his power to get Clark to accept the 
reduction, but he and the others had left their situations ...  Two smiths who had 
received an advance of wages, but who afterwards had to leave through slackness of 
work had now gone to work at the reduced rate.  The deputation believed the firm 
had got some work in and were now setting on a few men.  [Another firm was] 
discharging all the high waged men and were setting on fresh hands at [reduced 
wages]. 
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[The delegation] believed those at 38/- would have accepted the reduction but the 
members did not like the idea of those at 36/- being reduced to 34/- and those at 34/- 
down to 32/- per week.  [They thought] there would be no difficulty whatever in 
[the firm] getting as many men as they required at the reduced rate of wages, and 
could be done in a day or even less time.  At the same time they felt assured if a 
reduction took place at [this firm], the same would take place at Blythes and other 
shops.  Four of our members belonging to the Millwall branch had started that 
morning at the reduced rate, and the pattern makers were now commencing work for 
36/- per week.36 
The variation in wages within one firm is notable;  at this time, the ‘standard rate’ for 
London was 36/- per week.  So too is the variety of responses:  some men quit while 
others accepted the reduction. 
By now, the EC was increasingly cautious in authorising payments of strike pay, and 
there are repeated mention of ‘the present state of trade’.37  By 1869, the EC was actively 
discouraging strike action, even where the alternative was to accept a wage reduction;  for 
example: 
29th May That the members of the Halifax branch be recommended to prevent as far as 
possible the introduction of piece work, at the same time they must be careful 
not to bring about a strike seeing the present state of trade. 
16th June That in the event of the factory operatives at Hyde accepting a reduction of 5 
per cent, and that the same has to apply to our members, the Council would 
recommend the members affected not to strike work seeing the present state of 
trade. 
29th June That the London East branch be instructed not to withdraw members from 
Messrs. Ravenhill & Co. who are in receipt of 33/- per week seeing the 
present state of trade and the practice of that factory for years past.38 
It was at this time that the Contingent benefit was suspended, although those involved in 
strikes remained entitled to Donation benefit. 
By the summer of 1871, economic conditions had improved although there were 
significant regional variations.  The shipbuilding industry of the north-east was expanding 
rapidly, so that region escaped relatively lightly and quickly from the recession.  There 
had been earlier attempts to reduce the working week to 54 hours, or a nine-hour day, and 
in early 1871 this was again sought on Wearside, and then nearby on Tyneside.  This was 
unquestionably an aggressive move by the workers, the employers’ refusal to reduce 
hours being followed by a mass resignation by the men.  The action was organised by a 
specially-formed ‘Nine Hours League’ but the leaders were mostly ASE members, the 
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most prominent was the same John Burnett who became the first Labour Correspondent, 
and the Executive in London treated the League and the Newcastle district committee as 
one and the same.39 
A protracted struggle developed on Tyneside, in which the League sought to 
financially support the strikers, many being non-unionists;  to prevent work in progress 
being moved elsewhere; and to prevent strike breakers being imported from as far away 
as Belgium.  Initially the EC helped little, resisting even payment of Donation benefit for 
a month and censuring other districts for organising meetings supporting the strike.  
However, after rejecting many requests from various districts to give assistance, in mid-
July they agreed to circulate the branches requesting financial support for the strike.40  By 
August they were co-ordinating the blacking of work transferred from Tyneside and 
sending an agent to Belgium to discourage recruitment of strike breakers.41  Then, 
following victory on Tyneside in early October, the EC worked actively to extend the 
movement across the country and by December they were repeatedly suggesting that 
districts ‘use their best endeavours to get the nine hours’, authorising payments of the re-
introduced Contingent benefit where employers resisted;  at the same time they were 
discouraging district committees in the north-east who wanted to go further.42  In most 
districts the employers seem to have put up little resistance. 
Summarising this history, district committees would seem to have responded mainly to 
events within their own local labour markets, but were constantly being reminded by the 
London office and EC of both the financial position of the union and events in other 
localities.  The policy of the EC would seem to have been to equalise wages and 
conditions between workers within a workplace, between employers, and between 
districts.  This same broad policy can be found in the comments of the newly-created 
ASE district organisers in the 1890s.  All were concerned at the variation in wages within 
their districts, and emphasised this more than the absolute level of wages.  This, for 
example, was the view of the organiser for the Midland counties: 
His [aim] is to get one union alone in the industry, and that one so strong and 
perfect as to be able to govern the trade.  To do this it is necessary to first so 
organise the trade that no skilled man shall be left outside the Society quite 
regardless of whether he gets the full standard rate, or a shilling or two less ... .  
Then when all or nearly all are in he hopes to begin by levelling up the wages of the 
low paid men to an equality with the others in the same town ...  When that is 
achieved the next object is to level all the towns up to one rate and that the highest 
one.  Thus the Lincoln rate is now only 28/-, the Derby rate 31/- while Birmingham 
is 34/- and for these differences he can see no justification.  His object therefore is to 
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raise them all even the lowest places, like Gainsborough and Grantham ... to at least 
the Birmingham level ... 
He fails to see any argument whatsoever against a uniform rate for the whole 
country.  The Lincoln man at 28/- per week is quite as good a workman, and works 
quite as hard as the B’ham man at 34/-.  He does not believe in allowing different 
rates on account of difference in the cost of living in various towns — that he says is 
an old-fashioned and played-out argument.  Competition has quite overcome the 
strength of that plea.43 
III 
The previous section analysed the relationship between unemployment and wages from 
qualitative evidence, but the ASE gathered abundant statistics on local unemployment 
and wage rates.  It is therefore possible to analyse the union’s behaviour and the influence 
of unemployment on Standard Rates more formally .  The main source of wage data is the 
table listing ‘standard time rates of wages for a full week’s work (exclusive of overtime) 
recognised for fitters ... at January 1st of each year’, in an unpublished Board of Trade 
report.44  These data are described as ‘compiled from the reports of the Amal. Society of 
Engineers and the Steam Engine Makers’ Society, and from returns furnished by the 
unions.’  The last year listed is 1906, and for 1902-11 additional rates for the same towns 
were taken from the union’s own annual compilation of rates;  where there was any 
disagreement, the latter source was used.45  For earlier dates, some additional information 
was taken from a tabulation of ‘trade union standard rates’ by Bowley and Wood.46 
The previous section suggests that changes in the ‘standard rate’ for a given town 
should be interpreted as a conscious decision taken collectively by the relevant union 
branch or district committee, influenced but not controlled by the urgings of the General 
Secretary and the Executive Council.  One factor which would clearly encourage 
changes, and particularly reductions, was the unemployment rate among the membership, 
but the union’s finances and its ability to recruit and retain its membership were also 
relevant.  Further, officials in a particular town might have been influenced both by the 
situation in the town itself and in the remainder of the union.  The following explanatory 
variables were therefore included, all of them information available to local union 
officials at the time through the ASE’s annual and monthly reports;  figure 2 summarises 
the behaviour of these variables at a national aggregate level. 
Firstly, unemployment was measured by the numbers on ‘donation benefit’, computing 
annual averages from rates in the ASE’s Monthly Reports for January and July.  The 
analysis carefully distinguishes between local unemployment, in the branches making up 
the districts to which the wage rates refer, and unemployment in the remainder of the 
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country;  for each town, a separate ‘national’ rate was calculated excluding the local 
branches .  The impact of strikes was minimised by deducting those on strike benefits 
from the total on donation.  Local and national unemployment rates for the previous year 
were included as separate variables. 
Secondly, union officials measured the union’s strength mainly through the size of its 
membership and therefore looked to their ability to recruit and retain members.  This was 
measured here in two ways, by changes in the membership over the year, computed from 
the Monthly Reports, and by the number of new admissions, as tabulated for each branch 
in the Annual Reports.  Ideally, the analysis would also include data on the number of 
‘exclusions’, generally for non-payment of dues, and on inter-branch transfers, but as all 
available information is for individual branches, not districts, this would require a large 
volume of additional data.   For now we can say that admissions statistics more directly 
measure the union’s capacity to recruit locally, while change in the membership also 
reflected migration and exclusions.  Four distinct variables were included in the analysis:  
the percentage increase in the local membership during the year and the percentage 
increase in all other branches;  the number of new members admitted to local branches as 
a percentage of initial membership, and the equivalent percentage of new members 
admitted to all other branches. 
Thirdly, the national Executive Council’s constant concern was ‘the state of the funds’, 
the equalisation system meaning that all branch expenditure was effectively shared and it 
was the overall national financial balance which mattered.  This was represented by the 
annual financial balance per member for the year, expressed in constant 1900 pounds.47. 
Lastly, changes in the cost of living were included as a possible influence on wage 
demands.  No attempt has been made to calculate town-specific indices, but the main 
sources of inter-urban price variations were coal and housing, together comprising 13.3 
per cent of the index.  This was a period of modest inflation:  over the 1870-1910 period 
the maximum and minimum values of the index were 122.1 for 1873 and 93.5 for 1896.48 
Wage data were available for 48 towns, although continuous series are available for all 
of them only from 1894.49   Only three towns provide continuous series before 1870, and 
this was therefore taken as the first year for the analysis, with twenty towns available. 
Three-quarters of all observations show no change on the previous year, and when rates 
changed it was normally by a round number:  81 per cent of all increases and 78 per cent 
of all reductions were of one or two shillings per week.  Rates for individual towns cannot 
therefore be treated as continuous variables and the following analysis therefore focuses 
on the decision whether or not to raise or lower the standard rate:  the money wage rates 
for each town are used to create two categorical response variables, a measure of 
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increases with a value of 1 if the rate was higher than the previous year and 0 otherwise, 
and a similar measure of reductions.  These two categorical responses were related to the 
conventionally-measured explanatory variables using logistic regression, essentially 
measuring how, for example, a given reduction in unemployment resulted not in any 
particular percentage increase in wages but rather in a changed likelihood of some 
increase in wages. 
Figure 3 maps the 48 towns according to the frequency with which wages changed, 
regardless of direction, showing that volatile wages were strongly associated with high 
long-run average regional unemployment rates.  Tables 2 and 3 present the final ‘best fit’ 
relationships for each response variable, the use of over 1,400 observations ensuring the 
robustness of the results:   these relationships explain 94 per cent of the overall variance 
for wage decreases and 84 per cent for wage increases.50  The single most important 
determinant of the decision to cut the Standard Rate, measured by R, was the 
unemployment rate for the particular district.  The unemployment rate in the rest of the 
country was not a factor:  as figure 3 shows, districts little affected by unemployment 
seldom cut wages, whatever the national pattern.  However, the state of the union 
nationally did matter:  falling membership and funds encouraged wage cuts.  The final 
significant factor, local admissions, has a perverse positive association with wages, but 
while significant this has much the highest standard error. 
Different factors determined wage increases.  The most important explanatory factor 
was the local admission rate, the best available measure of an expanding local demand for 
labour given that unemployment rates were minimal for long periods during booms, 
especially in southern areas.  The national unemployment rate was the next most 
important factor, a high rate in other districts reducing the likelihood of an increase even 
if the district itself was prospering, followed by the union’s overall financial situation and 
admissions rate. 
IV 
Macro-economists have shown little interest in the empirical basis for Phillips’ original 
study, but to anyone familiar with the limitations of pre-1914 British labour statistics the 
Phillips’ curve works remarkably, indeed suspiciously well.51  In particular, the 
unemployment data derive from a notoriously narrow group of trade unions, mainly in 
construction and the metal trades, while the wage series include a broader range of 
sectors. ‘Standard rates’ were clearly far stickier than true average wage rates, let alone 
earnings.  More detailed investigation shows that many of the sectors that supposedly 
contributed to the wage series in fact supplied only interpolated values which served 
merely to suppress the cyclical variation in the true annual series. 
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Once we understand the true nature of Phillips’ data, the relationship between wages 
and unemployment emerges as more micro-economic than macro-economic, but no less 
real.  Within the Amalgamated Engineers, local unemployment rates were the single most 
important determinant of wage reductions;  very much as we would expect, given the 
very direct relationship between ‘standard rates’ and eligibility for unemployment benefit.  
Unemployment rates were less important to wage increases mainly because artisan 
unionists experienced essentially full employment outside recessions and admissions rates 
are consequently a better basis for distinguishing between periods of rapid expansion and 
mere prosperity.  These results of course relate to just one trade union, but it was both the 
largest national union and the dominant source of Phillips’ data for the earliest years of 
his series.52 
Lastly, this paper forms part of an investigation into the fine structure of British labour 
markets pre-1914, drawing on the wealth of data available to those willing to venture 
beyond the published aggregates used by Phillips and his macro-economic successors.  
The findings demonstrate the geographical differentiation of local labour markets, the 
wage-unemployment trade-off being almost absent from the more stable local economies 
of southern England.  However, they also demonstrate the integration of labour markets 
over space: wage determination was local, but events elsewhere had a large influence.53  
In both respects, late nineteenth century British labour markets emerge as surprisingly 
modern. 
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Table 1: Trade Unions providing Unemployment Series, 1860-1910 
Society (& starting  Membership at end of year: 
 date of series)   1860   1870   1880   1890   1900   1910 
a)  Metal Trades 
Amalgamated Society 
of Engineers (1851) 20,935 34,711 44,692 67,928 83,574 100,111 
Friendly Society of 
Iron Founders (1854) 7,973 8,994 11,380 14,821 18,357 17,490 
Associated Blacksmith’s 
Society (1859) 8,56 1,590 2,002 2,300 2,933 2,953 
Steam Engine Makers’ 
Society (1865) --- 2,819 4,134 5,822 8,495 13,328 
United Society of 
Boilermakers (1873) --- --- 17,688 32,926 47,670 49,245 
 United Pattern Makers’ 
Society (1881) --- --- --- 2,205 4,604 7,214 
Total, metal trades 29,764 48,114 79,896 126,002 165,633 190,341 
b) Other Trades 
London Society of 
Compositors (1848) 2,650 3,350 5,100 8,910 11,287 12,231 
Warehousemen’s Philhar 
-monic Society (1850) 97 173 196 110 84 --- 
London Operative Zinc 
Workers’ Society (1855) 26 33 57 69 107 64 
London Consol.Soc.of 
J’men B’kbinders (1856) 634 690 823 1,266 4,064 1,166 
Amal.Soc. of Carpenters 
& Joiners (1863) --- 10,178 17,764 31,495 65,012 55,785 
Glass Bottle Makers of 
Yorkshire (1867) --- 792 1,061 1,899 2,840 2,450 
United Kingdom Society 
of Coachmakers (1867) --- 5,801 4,989 5,367 6,463 6,743 
Alliance Cabinet 
Makers (1868) --- 242 1,346 4,298 5,270 6,685 
Amalgamated Society 
of Millsawyers (1873) --- --- 502 692 4,179 4,079 
Typographical 
Association (1873) --- --- 5,350 9,016 16,179 21,436 
Kilkenny Operative 
Bakers (1874) --- --- 50 45 --- 28 
United Society of 
Brushmakers (1878) --- --- 1,583 --- 1,470 1,109 
Total, other trades 3,407 11,259 38,821 63,167 114,015 111,648 
Total, all unions 33,171 69,373 118,717 189,169 282,588 302,117 
Total, Trade Unions 
Reporting Unempl. %   140,000 221,000 528,000 731,000 
Source: 4th, 13th & 17th Reports on Trade Unions; 18th Abstract of Labour Statistics. 
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Table 2: 







Local Unemployment Rate 0.1382 0.0224 0.2399 
National Membership Change  -0.1400 0.0349 -0.1498 
National Financial Balance -0.0256 0.0067 -0.1425 
Local Admissions Rate 0.0448 5.8787 0.0786 
Constant -3.9441 0.2763  
Source: See text 
 
Table 3: 







Local Admissions Rate 0.0624 0.0123 0.1321 
National Unemployment Rate -0.1997 0.0491 -0.1036 
National Financial Balance 0.0159 0.0044 0.0907 
National Admissions Rate 0.0646 0.0275 0.0510 
Constant -2.2593 0.3988  
Source: See text 
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Figure 1: 




Sources: Wage Index from Phelps Brown and Hopkins, ‘Wage rates in five 
countries’, p.276;  rates for 1850-59 from Wood, ‘Real wages’, pp.102-3 
(with adjustment for working hours specified by Phelps-Brown and 
Hopkins, p.264, and re-indexed to 1890=100). 
 Unemployment series from Board of Trade, British and Foreign Trade, 
pp.90-91;  data for 1904-14 from Ministry of Labour, Twenty-first 
Abstract of Labour Statistics. 
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Figure 2: 




Sources: A.S.E. Monthly and Annual Reports 
 




Unemployment and the volatility of money 




Sources: Unemployment rates computed from A.S.E. Monthly Reports for 
January and July; for wage rates, see text. 
